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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of acquirer-target social connections along with the target 52-week 
high (Baker, Pan, & Wurgler, 2012) on acquisition premiums. We show that acquisition premium is 
more sensitive to first-degree connection than the reference point, suggesting that information is the 
main driving force for determining acquisition premiums. The findings also indicate that connected 
directors are more likely to favour firms where they hold higher positions and negotiate favourable 
premiums. Acquirers pay lower premiums when target directors are retained in the new entity. 
Connected acquirers are also more likely to finance their deals with equity. Overall, this paper 
provides support to the information flow hypothesis that acquirers with social connections have 
better access to target information and enhanced bargaining power in negotiations.  
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1. Introduction 
Social network studies have attracted considerable interest from researchers. A growing 
body of literature has introduced social network theory into M&A studies and explored the 
impact of social connection on takeover outcomes. These studies emphasise the social ties 
between acquirers and targets but find mixed results in terms of the effects of social 
connection. On the one hand, acquirers with a social connection would benefit from the 
information advantage and be better able to determine the target’s true value, therefore 
enhancing their bargaining power in negotiation and paying a lower premium for the target 
(Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Mol, 2001; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Schoorman, Bazerman, & Atkin, 
1981). On the other hand, social connection could raise issues (Ishii & Xuan, 2014) such as 
over-trust, familiarity bias (Cao et al., 2009), social conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004) and overconfidence of acquirer management (Roll, 1986), therefore increasing the 
likelihood of overpayment and leading to inefficient and unprofitable transactions.1  
Motivated by the conflicting results, we re-examine the social links between acquirers and 
targets and provide further evidence for the role of social connection in the takeover 
process. Specifically, this study concentrates on the relationship between acquirer-target 
connection and acquisition premium by incorporating the target’s 52-week reference point. 
Acquisition premium is defined as offer price, as the log percentage difference from the 
target's share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012). 
Previous studies indicate that a premium is not only an important measurement for the 
market to evaluate takeover transactions for bidders and targets but also strongly influences 
merging firms’ financial situations and post-acquisition performance in the short and even 
the long term (Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013; Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, & 
Travlos, 2012; Ayers, Lefanowicz, & Robinson, 2003; Holmén, Nivorozhkin, & Rana, 
2014; Schwert, 1996). More importantly, among the indicators of takeover outcomes, 
acquisition premium is directly and largely affected by connection, since premiums best 
                                                     
1 Familiarity bias describes the observation that individuals prefer familiar choices or decisions, avoiding any changes from the status quo 
(Cao et al., 2009). Social conformity refers to the bias that individuals are likely to follow the opinions of their peers instead of pursuing 
their own personal beliefs (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). This leads to inefficient negotiations between acquirer and target, in which the 
respective shareholders’ interest is not properly represented. 
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reflects the information advantage and bargaining power in the negotiations between 
acquirers and their targets. Hence, analysing premiums could better verify the information 
hypothesis of social network studies. 
This paper introduces a psychological reference point (Baker et al., 2012) to examine what 
plays a determining role in target valuation and bid premium. According to Baker et al. 
(2012), acquisition partners are highly affected by the anchoring effect in pricing targets 
and negotiating premium. 52-week high price represents the recent peak price achieved by 
a firm in the past 52 weeks (Baker et al., 2012). The 52-week high is easily obtained and 
widely cited as firm valuation measure in the financial media and management reports. 
Both acquirers and targets regard a target’s 52-week high as a psychological reference point 
for target valuation and rely heavily on this psychological anchor when negotiating their 
offer premium.2  A higher target 52-week high implies a higher bid premium. Such a 
significant and positive relationship has been widely confirmed by recent studies 
(Alexandridis et al., 2013; Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, & Thorburn, 2014). By involving 
reference point theory (Baker et al., 2012) as an additional testing framework, this study 
establishes a more appropriate research framework to investigate whether acquisition 
premium is more affected by the acquirer’s social network or a psychological anchor. In 
this paper, we adopt two types of cross-firm connections based on the BoardEx database: 
first-degree and second-degree connections. A first-degree connection refers to a situation 
in which a board director or executive serves on both acquiring and target firm boards prior 
to the deal announcement, while a second-degree connection happens when two 
individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past 
experience (such as employment history or educational background) 3 . First-degree 
connection links bidders with targets via the same individual director, while second-degree 
connection involves two directors and connects merging parties via the third firm. 
Therefore, a first-degree connection is a more direct and closer relation between acquirers 
and targets than a second-degree connection. Hence, information obtained through a first-
                                                     
2 The target 52-week high is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the period from 365 days to 30 days before the takeover 
announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference of the target stock price 30 days before the takeover announcement (Baker et al., 
2012). 
3 BoardEx considers different relationship types. Possible routes are classified as follows: Quoted, Non-Quoted, Not for Profit, Education 
and Other. The latter contains connections that cannot be distinguished in any other allocations, for instance military service. Thus, such a 
connection could be non-professional or, rather, not business related. 
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degree connection is more comprehensive and accurate, resulting in more precise valuation. 
Moreover, first-degree connections could better smooth the information exchange and 
communication between merging parties, leading to greater bargaining power and stronger 
impact in the negotiation of premium. 
We empirically test the impact of social connection by using a sample of 1,502 US M&A 
deals between 2001 and 2016, out of which 15.18% are connected either by first- or 
second-degree connections. We find that the existence of social connection reduces 
premium by 6.53% relative to non-connected transactions. In first-degree connected deals, 
acquiring firms pay on average 11.33% less premium than in takeovers with no connection. 
The findings provide evidence that bidders could benefit from social connection by being 
better able to estimate targets’ true value and improve their own bargaining power, therefore 
paying lower acquisition premiums. In particular, this information advantage is 
strengthened for bidders with a first-degree connection, since acquirers would have better 
communication during negotiation, helping them secure a much lower and more favourable 
offer premium. 
We further control for the reference point – target 52-week high – in the premium analysis. 
According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is positively related with bid 
premium. We divide the full sample into three groups based on the target 52-week reference 
point. Compared with the premiums paid in non-connected deals, connected acquirers pay 
2.94% less within the group of low target 52-week reference points and 10.61% less within 
the group of high 52-week reference points. This indicates that connected acquirers are less 
affected by the target’s 52-week reference point. The greater influence of first-degree 
connection than reference point is supported by the multivariate analysis. In particular, we 
observe that first-degree connections are negatively related to premiums, while we find no 
significant relation between target 52-week reference point and premiums after controlling 
for year and industry fixed effects. The results indicate that first-degree connection has a 
stronger effect than target reference point in determining the amount of premium. The 
findings indicate that connected acquirer bargaining power is substantially increased, such 
that merging firms ignore the reference point when valuing the target during negotiation. 
Therefore, information advantage, rather than reference point, is the main determinant of 
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the acquisition premium in deals with a first-degree connection. 
For robustness reasons, we focus solely on the CEO dimension. We examine cases where 
the CEO himself/herself connects the two merging firms. Based on this definition, CEO 
connections are subdivided into CEO first-degree connections and CEO second-degree 
connections. We find that CEO connections significantly reduce the premium paid by 
acquirers by 12.50% in general and by 15.25% in first-degree connected deals respectively. 
The finding can be attributed to more accurate information provided by target CEOs and 
their powerful role in decision-making. 
In addition, we explore incentives of why connected directors favour acquirers over targets. 
We find that acquirers pay a lower premium when retaining directors who link acquirers 
and targets. In first-degree connected deals, the retention of connected directors leads to 
significantly lower premium (13.17%). All the interlocking directors in this sample were offered 
directorship roles/positions in the new/merged firm. In second-degree connected deals, 
acquirers that retain connected directors pay 6.26% lower premium than firms that offer no 
board seats. These connected directors obtain more benefit and power from acquiring firms, 
working in the best interests of acquirers and resulting in lower premium. In addition, 
acquisitions in which connected directors hold equivalent level positions in both the bidder 
and the target firm (48.48%) are associated with average 28.20% premium, significantly 
lower than the 46.94% premium in deals where the director holds a higher position in the 
target. Therefore, connected directors have self-incentive to assist in the completion of 
takeover deals and remain in the combined firm. In deals with second-degree connection, 
acquirers that recruit connected target directors to the new board are more likely to pay 
lower premium, since a board seat in the combined firm is secured. Hence, target connected 
directors have strong self-incentive to accelerate the acquisition process and compromise on 
lower acquisition premium, resulting in deviation from target shareholders’ interest.  
Finally, we examine the impact of connections on the medium of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions. Bidders in connected transactions are prone to finance acquisition with their 
overvalued stock. Due to information asymmetry, targets’ shareholders run the risk of 
accepting bidders’ overvalued equity. Connections between bidders and targets can increase 
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trust and information flow; therefore, targets’ shareholders can better value bidder stock, 
leading to a higher likelihood of equity payments. 
 We contribute to the current literature in several ways. First, we add to the existing body of 
literature by taking into account the social ties between acquirers and targets. We provide 
evidence that the measurement of target value not only depends on the firm’s previous 
stock, operating and financial situation, but is also largely affected by the invisible social 
relations between acquirers and targets. In addition to Cai and Sevilir (2012), who provide 
similar evidence, we introduce the target 52-week high as a reference point for the existing 
framework. To our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate reference point theory (Baker 
et al., 2012) in premium analysis. According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is 
an important reference point for both acquirers and targets to price the target during 
negotiation. On the one hand, we verify a positive relation between target 52-week high and 
acquisition premium. On the other hand, we find that in first-degree connected deals, 
acquisition premium is not affected by the target 52-week high and is substantially 
decreased by the existence of a first-degree connection. That is, information advantage in 
first-degree connections significantly enhances acquirers’ bargaining power and generates a 
much greater influence on the offer premium than reference point. Information is the main 
determinant of acquisition premium, rather than target 52-week high. We verify the 
information hypothesis in cross-firm connections, while previous studies draw ambivalent 
conclusions regarding the impact of social connections on takeover activities. 
Another contribution relates to the method of payment. Few studies consider the impact of 
social connection on the choice of takeover timing and payment method. In addition to 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan's (2005) theoretical explanation of why targets 
accept bidders’ overvalued equity, we show that a close bidder-target relationship plays an 
important role in explaining this fact. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) use a UK sample and 
demonstrate that connected deals are more likely to be paid with stock, attributed to the 
board effect. We employ a US sample and enrich the view by analysing the pre-
announcement stock performance of both acquirers and targets.  
We further contribute to studies on corporate governance and directorship. Unlike 
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Renneboog and Zhao (2014), who find that target directors that are connected with bidder 
directors are more likely to be invited to participate in the new board, we show that this has 
a further impact on determining acquisitions premium. We provide new evidence that first-
degree connected directors offer a lower premium if they hold more senior positions in the 
acquiring firms. In second-degree connected deals, a lower premium is offered to target 
firms if the target director is retained in the new board of the merged entity.  We support 
previous findings (Harford, 2003; Wang, Sakr, Ning, & Davidson, 2010) that target 
directors would prioritise their own interests and compromise on acquisition premium at the 
cost of target shareholders’ interests in order to obtain directorship in combined firms.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 
presents the development of our hypotheses. In Section 4 we describe our data and 
methodological approach. Section 5 connects our empirical results with our hypotheses and 
draws the first interpretation of our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and summarises 
our research. 
2. Literature review 
The main characteristic of social ties is that connection enables the flow of resources 
through a given network of individuals (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Information is among 
the most important resources in the business world, since individuals and companies suffer 
from information asymmetry (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In other words, it is a fact that one 
entity has more information than another.  
Recent studies on social networks indicate that social connections have both a positive and 
a negative impact on corporate performance and investment decisions. A considerable 
number of studies confirm the existence of information advantage in social networks. For 
example, Uzzi (1999) suggests that firms that are socially linked with middle-market 
banking have a lower cost of capital than those without a social connection. Engelberg, Gao 
and Parsons (2012) find that commercial banks deliver more favourable financing terms to 
connected firms due to the improved information and monitoring arising from that 
connection, including a lower interest rate, higher credit rating and better stock 
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performance. Cai and Sevilir (2012) address the board connection between acquiring firms 
and target firms and investigate its impact on acquisition performance. The findings show 
that social connection significantly increases the announcement return for acquirers and the 
combined entity. Moreover, bidders with a first-degree connection pay a lower acquisition 
premium and transaction cost, measured by total investment bank fees. Second-degree 
connection improves the operating performance of combined firms in the long run. The 
results confirm the information advantage hypothesis in M&A studies. However, Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) do not explain why connections between bidders and targets only benefit 
bidding firms. One therefore asks, if only acquirers benefit from board connections, why 
are target firms willing to accept less favourable deal items? 
However, Ishii and Xuan (2014) show that social connection has a negative effect on 
takeover activities due to issues of over-trust, familiarity bias and social conformity. Social 
connection via an individual network builds trust beyond single business transactions and 
last longer. Yet, over-trust leads to inefficient decision-making, resulting in inferior firm 
performance. Additionally, management (senior executives or directors) may over-trust the 
information they obtain through their personal network and overestimate the information 
quality as well as their power of control. Therefore, social connection may lead to the CEO 
hubris problem (Roll, 1986) and therefore negatively affect deal outcomes. Moreover, 
social connection may raise the issue of familiarity bias, which refers to a situation where 
individuals prefer to maintain the status quo and select familiar firms in their investment 
decisions. Therefore, firm management with social connections may prioritise familiar 
partners and neglect better business opportunities beyond their individual networks, 
resulting in less favourable investment decisions. Another issue raised in social connections 
is social conformity, which implies that individuals prefer to follow the decisions of the 
group rather than put forward their personal opinions (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). 
Similarly, social conformity may lead to inefficient decision-making and poor firm 
performance.  
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3. Hypotheses Development 
In this section we develop our hypotheses based on the main theory of social networks, 
psychological reference point theory and M&A studies. 
According to Baker et al. (2012), both acquiring and target firms regard the target 52-week 
high as a reference for the premium paid or received in the negotiation. In general, the 
settlement of takeover deals should be approved by target shareholders, management and 
bidding firms. For the majority of target shareholders, calculating firm valuation is a 
complex and time-consuming task, which requires much information and accurate forecast 
of targets. Therefore, target shareholders would often search for easily available 
benchmarks for pricing targets. The target 52-week high is the recent peak price that a 
target firm achieved before takeover announcement, which may be attained or exceeded in 
the future. Target 52-week high is easily obtained and widely cited in the financial media, 
and therefore can be used as a reference point for target valuation. For target management, 
using target 52-week high price as a negotiation anchor would save time and effort in 
estimating firm valuation and communicating with shareholders. For acquiring firms, 
information shortage makes it more difficult to value and negotiate with target firms. 
Therefore, acquirers are likely to anchor target recent peak price in order to settle M&A 
transactions. 
However, social connection could alter the target valuation and negotiation for acquisition 
partners. The presence of inter-firm connection facilitates information transfer and 
exchange via individual networks, thus reducing the information asymmetry between firms 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). In M&A deals, social connection, especially first-degree 
connection, brings a large information advantage to acquiring firms. Connected acquirers 
have better access (Mol, 2001) to the target’s information, which is more detailed, accurate 
and current than the target 52-week high to value the target firm.4 If information is the main 
driver of lower premiums paid to target firms, closely connected bidders should pay lower 
premiums. Moreover, bidder-acquirer connection greatly improves acquirers’ bargaining 
                                                     
4 By definition, 52-week high is the peak price that the target reached at least one month before acquisition. Target valuation at takeover 
announcement may derive from the peak price. Therefore, target value estimated on the basis of peak price (target 52-week high) may not 
be accurate. 
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power (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Schoorman et al., 1981) and weakens the effect of target 
reference point on premiums. Therefore, we hypothesise that:  
H1: After controlling for the 52-week high reference point, first-degree connected bidders 
pay lower premiums than non-connected bidders. 
 
Baker et al. (2012) introduce the psychological phenomenon of “anchoring-and-
adjustment” to explain the process of target pricing. “Anchoring-and-adjustment” suggest 
that individuals would select a preliminary estimate as an anchor (reference point), and then 
adjust towards the final decision or true value (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). In mergers and acquisitions, the peak price achieved by targets in the 
last 52 weeks is regarded as the anchor or reference point of target valuation. Acquirers 
would base their offer price on the reference point and make subsequent adjustments 
according to information and negotiation. Acquirer-target connection, especially first-
degree connection, reduces information asymmetry and improves the bargaining power in 
the negotiation. Therefore, the existence of social connection positively affects the 
adjustment of bidding premium. 
 
According to Baker et al. (2012), by anchoring high reference points (peak price of target 
firms), bidders are more likely to pay a higher premium and more likely to deviate from 
target’s true value. However, lower target 52-week high represents a smaller difference 
between peak price in the last 52 weeks and recent share price. Anchoring low quantile of 
targets’ 52-week high for premium is associated with low premiums. In the adjustment 
process, acquirers would revise their offer price towards the true value of target firms. 
Acquirers with first-degree connection have better access to target true value and better 
bargaining power in the negotiation, and therefore pay lower offer price in deals with 
higher target reference points. The adjustment in first-degree connected deals is larger and 
more sufficient when the target reference point is high. It is in this regime that the 
anchoring behavioural bias is more pronounced and the information advantage emanating 
from connections helps bidders adjust their valuation accordingly and pay relatively lower 
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premiums. The adjustment effect of close connection is lower in the low quantile of 
reference points, as the anchoring effect is less pronounced. The additional information 
brought by connection may have less of an influence in reducing premiums. Therefore, we 
expect that: 
H2: The lower premiums paid by connected bidders should be more pronounced when the 
target 52-week reference point is high. 
 
Previous literature indicates that overlapping directors facilitate information transfer and 
smooth communication between connected firms (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Salancik 
& Pfeffer, 1978). However, the contribution of resources and experience is highly affected 
by the organisation identification (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2006; Shropshire, 
2010). Organisational identification, a concept in management studies, refers to how 
employees identify with or understand firms, and therefore affects employees’ contribution 
to their work. Directors who hold positions on multiple boards have stronger organisational 
identification in the firms where they work as CEO/Chair. Therefore, interlocking directors 
would favour those firms and contribute more advice as well as knowledge to the 
organisation where they serve as CEO/Chair and have stronger organisational 
identification. Moreover, the position of CEO/Chair could bring more financial and non-
financial benefit as well as power to interlocking CEOs. Hence, interlocking directors 
would act in the interest of firms where they hold higher and more important positions. 
Therefore, we expect that: 
H3: Connected directors/executives are more likely to favour firms where they hold a 
higher position and negotiate favourable premiums.  
 
Target directors are more likely to accept a lower premium in exchange for directorship in 
newly merged firms (Wang et al., 2010). Board seats in newly merged firms would signal 
the high quality and expertise of directors and bring more job opportunities, resources and 
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network to the director (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Harford, 2003; Wang et al., 2010). 
Therefore, target directors may sacrifice shareholders’ interest and compromise on 
premiums in order to remain on the new board. Moreover, if acquirers and targets 
successfully merge, target firms may not exist in the future. Retained directors who 
previously worked in targets are responsible for representing the interests of “future” 
shareholders in the combined firms. Hence, target directors with a higher likelihood of 
being retained are more likely to approve deals with a lower premium. 
Furthermore, acquiring firms are willing to retain connected target directors (or senior 
executives) in newly merged firms. Previous literature finds that firms are willing to bring a 
“friend” or “someone they know” into the business due to the familiarity effect (Chen, 
Levy, Martin, & Shalev, 2014; Cooney, Madureira, Singh, & Yang, 2015). To maintain a 
long-term relationship, “friends” may take into account the interests of their partners 
(Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2008; Cooney et al., 2015; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 
2007). Moreover, target directors (or senior executives) who are linked with acquiring firms 
via personal network have better acknowledgement of targets and acquirers and therefore 
could accelerate the post-merger integration process (Li & Aguilera, 2008). Therefore, 
acquirers tend to retain target directors with whom they have a social connection. Overall, 
we expect that:  
H4: Acquirers pay a lower premium when connected target directors/executives are 
retained in the newly merged firms.  
 
CEOs play a more powerful and essential role in boards (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; L. A. 
Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 
2015; Finkelstein, 1992; Van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2015). L. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
propose a managerial power theory and indicate that CEOs dominate boards and have more 
bargaining power in negotiations, especially in matters of CEO compensation. The 
dominant role of managerial power could be attributed to the fact that board directors lack 
incentives to serve shareholders’ interests. On the one hand, the selection of board members 
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may be affected or controlled by CEOs (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Rosenstein, 1987; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). On the other hand, directors may compromise in exchange for 
financial benefit and business opportunities provided by CEOs. Moreover, directors would 
avoid conflicts with CEOs for social and physiological reasons, such as collegiality and 
friendship (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). 
CEOs have more accurate information than boards and are responsible for day-to-day 
operation and management activities. CEOs have superior information of their firm’s state 
of operation and financial situation (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Boards serve in 
advising and monitoring management and corporate performance. Directors are not directly 
involved in daily operations (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Board directors make decisions based 
on the information provided by management, and at times information transfers 
insufficiently between CEOs and board. 
Therefore, connection with CEOs is more valuable and efficient than connection with 
boards. Acquirers linked with target CEOs have greater information advantage and suffer 
less resistance from target firms. Acquirer CEOs who also sit on the target board would 
favour acquirers and negotiate lower premiums because they have more to gain in bidding 
firms. Hence, we expect that: 
H5: Acquirers with CEO connection, especially CEO first-degree connection, pay lower 
premiums than acquirers with board connection. 
 
Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) examine public takeover deals and find that 
acquirers are more likely to use cash deals when facing a greater extent of two-sided 
information asymmetry. Social connection, especially first-degree connection, reduces 
information asymmetry and improves the bargaining power of acquirers during negotiation, 
therefore increasing the likelihood of stock payments. The probability of deal completion 
affects acquirers’ choice of payment method. Cash offers may signal the high valuation of 
targets and therefore could deter the potential rivals of bidding firms, leading to a higher 
probability of successful deals. For public acquirers, the prevention of competing bids 
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outweighs the expected cost in information asymmetry. Connected acquirers have better 
access to target information and therefore better acknowledge the intrinsic value and 
operational and financial situation of target firms, as well as the bidder itself. Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) indicate that acquirers that are linked with targets are less likely to be 
involved in competing bid. Therefore, acquirers are more likely to use stock to pay for deals 
in socially connected deals. 
Generally, in stock offers, targets are uncertain of acquirers’ true stock valuation. Equity 
payment implies the overvaluation of bidding firms (Chang, 1998; Huang & Walkling, 
1987; Martynova & Renneboog, 2009; Travlos, 1987). Targets would only accept equity 
payment when the stock offer exceeds the true value of target firms. Hence, acquirers take 
longer to negotiate and complete deals when the payment is made partly or entirely with 
stocks (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). Acquirer-target connection increases the 
trust and bargaining power between two parties. Targets in socially connected deals have 
better access to valuation of bidders’ stock, increasing the likelihood of accepting equity 
payments. Moreover, in stock offers, a target’s board of directors could exchange the shares 
of target firms for the shares of bidding and increase their voting power in the newly 
merged firms (Ghosh & Ruland, 1998). Therefore, a target’s board would favour stock 
payment if they desire to maintain their influence in the new board. Additionally, target 
boards may face tax obligations when a deal is paid with cash (Travlos, 1987; Wansley, 
Lane, & Yang, 1983). Connected directors who previously worked in the target are more 
likely to be retained by the combined firms due to the familiarity effect (Chen et al., 2014; 
Cooney et al., 2015). Therefore, connected target directors tend to discourage cash offers 
due to personal interest. Therefore, we expect that: 
H6: Acquirers in connected deals are more likely to finance acquisitions with stock. 
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4. Data 
4.1. Data and selection criteria 
The data for our analysis is gathered from different sources. We collect US takeover deal 
information over the period from 1st January 2001 to 31st December 2016 from the 
Thomson One database. The timeframe was selected to match the growing data availability 
of BoardEx, which started in 1999.5 The original sample contains 140,418 deals. Because 
of the availability of information, we focus only on public transactions where both acquirer 
and target are quoted, leaving 4,750 observations. Moreover, we only include deals of at 
least $10 million, resulting in 3,809 deals. We only consider takeovers with a transfer of 
control. Specifically, we select transactions in which the acquirer obtained more than 50% 
ownership of the target, leaving 2,528 takeover bids. We drop another 1,026 observations 
where information is not available in the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. Finally, we 
obtain a full sample of 1,502 M&A deals. 
For the identification of social connections between acquirer and target companies, we 
access relationship data from BoardEx. These data were collected and linked manually 
using the Point-to-Point tool for each M&A deal.6 If more than one company was listed 
with the same or a similar name, we hand-checked and compared the data by utilising our 
previously computed market values to identify the appropriate company. The classification 
of social connections is based on the BoardEx data. Connection includes both first-degree 
and second-degree connections. A first-degree connection classifies a CEO or board 
member that serves on both the acquirer’s and the target’s boards at the time of the deal 
announcement.7 A second-degree connection represents a social tie at board level between 
two individuals respectively from the acquirer and target firms. For second-degree 
connections we allow any possible connection between two peers, including employment 
history and educational background. 
We split the full sample into two subgroups: 228 deals with a social connection and 1,274 
                                                     
5 The BoardEx database is widely used when analysing social connections in a business context. Other studies using BoardEx include 
Engelberg et al. (2012) and Ishii and Xuan (2014). However, both studies automatically retrieve the data. We, on the other hand, 
manually check every cross-firm connection.  
6 BoardEx’s Point-to-Point tool allows us to manually control for connections between two companies. It has the advantage that we can 
personally select the companies’ names. 
7 Herein, board member does not include CEO. 
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deals with no connection. We categorise the connected deals into 66 first-degree connected 
deals and 162 second-degree connected deals, in which only second-degree connected 
transactions are included.  Furthermore, we reclassify the socially connected deals into 106 
CEO-connected deals, in which either acquirer or target CEO links the bidding and target 
firms, and 122 board-connected deals, in which a board member is the connection between 
merging firms. Specifically, CEO-connected deals include 45 first-degree CEO-connected 
deals, where the CEO in the bidding or target firm serves as an executive, and 61 second-
degree CEO-connected deals, in which acquirer or target CEOs share past experience with 
board members or executives in other merging firms. Likewise, deals with board 
connection consist of 21 first-degree board-connected deals, in which acquirer board 
members also serve on the target’s board, and 101 second-degree board-connected deals, in 
which acquirer board members have social ties with target board members. 
4.2. The sample 
The sample consists of 1,502 M&A deals. Table 1 illustrates the number of M&A deals by 
year and industry of the acquirers. We classify deals into two main groups for our research, 
namely connected and non-connected deals. The connected subsample represents all M&A 
deals where we successfully identify a first- or second-degree connection. Otherwise, the 
deal is specified as non-connected. In general, the large number of M&A deals is 
distributed over the period from 2003 to 2006 and from 2014 to 2016, during which sixth 
(Alexandridis et al., 2012) and seventh merger waves (Mavis et al., 2016) occur.8 Starting 
from 2014, the number and value of M&A transactions substantially increases in the US 
market. The highest proportion of connected deals falls within 2013 to 2016. The connected 
deals announced in 2013 to 2016 mainly occur in the finance industry and business 
equipment industry.  
The industry classification is based on the acquirer’s industry, according to the Fama-
French 12-industry classification. It is evident that Finance and Business Equipment 
companies initiate most of the deals, together representing 58.39% of our entire sample. 
                                                     
8 Following Harford (2003), Mavis et al. (2016) identify the emergence of a seventh merger wave in banking, healthcare, real estate and 
trading, etc. industries over the period from 2011 to 2013. 
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This pattern is also evident for our connected deals, where both industries account for 
48.25% of all connected deals. Further, we observe that some industries only contain a few 
connected deals, for instance Consumer Durables or Consumer Non-Durables. To control 
for this inequality, we employ industry fixed effects in our multivariate analysis. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for firm and deal characteristics. An explicit 
definition and the source for each reported variable is reported in Appendix A. Additionally, 
we conduct the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to analyse whether the differences between our 
sub-groups are statically significant. In general, we observe significant differences between 
connected and non-connected deals. The acquirers in connected deals have higher Tobin’s 
Q, higher market values (MV) and greater returns on assets (ROA), implying that those 
companies have higher market valuation and outperform their peers in terms of 
profitability. Interestingly, we observe that connected targets have higher market value but 
lower Tobin’s Q. In general, acquirers have higher Tobin’s Q than targets, implying that 
acquirers are relatively overvalued compared to targets (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & 
Teoh, 2006). The difference of Tobin’s Q is larger between acquirers and targets in deals 
where merging parties are socially linked, which implies that the extent of misevaluation is 
more salient in connected deals.9  
Due to the larger size of connected target firms, connected deals are substantially higher in 
terms of transaction value and relative deal size. All connected deals together represent 
25.15% of the total transaction value of our sample. Interestingly, the average premium 
paid for connected targets is significantly lower (by 6.53%) compared to non-connected 
targets, while we do not observe a striking difference of target 52-week reference points 
between connected and non-connected deals. This is the first evidence supporting our first 
hypothesis, which states that connected bidders pay lower premium regardless of reference 
point. In addition, we find that connected deals are more frequently paid completely with 
stocks. The acquirers’ run up, an indicator of overvaluation, is higher in connected deals, 
implying that connected acquirers are likely to time their acquisitions and proceed when 
                                                     
9 In socially connected deals, Tobin’s Q is on average 4.05 for acquirers, and 2.69 for targets, where in non-connected deals, the average 
Tobin’s Q for acquirers and targets is 3.12 and 2.80, respectively.   
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their stock is overvalued. According to Travlos (1987) and Dong et al. (2006), acquirers 
tend to pay target firms with overvalued stocks. This could explain the lower acquisition 
premium in connected deals, since connected acquirers might finance transactions with 
overvalued stocks. Therefore, we need to control for the method of payment in our 
multivariate analysis.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of all variables in this study. As expected, we observe 
the strong correlation between premium and first-degree connection as well as target 
reference point (Baker et al., 2012). In line with Officer (2003), premiums are positively 
associated with cash payment and negatively related with stock payment. Premiums are 
significantly increased in tender offers and deals involving multiple bidding firms 
(Edmister & Walkling, 1985; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004; Officer, 2003). 
Furthermore, socially connected deals are more likely to be financed with acquirers’ equity. 
Larger-sized bidders tend to select stocks as the medium of payment. Additionally, a 
positive relation is observed between stock payment and transaction value. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. The impact of social connections and target 52-week reference point on acquisition 
premiums 
5.1.1. Target 52-week high and acquisition premium 
In this section, we test the reliability of target 52-week high in affecting offer premium. 
Following Baker et al. (2012), we employ target peak price over various horizons (13 
weeks, 26 weeks, 39 weeks and 104 weeks prior to announcement date) as alternative target 
levels. Similar to target 52-week high, X-week high is calculated as the log percentage 
difference of the target’s X-week high share price over the share price four weeks before 
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the M&A deal announcement. Next, we use histograms to plot the density of the difference 
between offer price and target reference points (target 13-week high, 26-week high, 39-
week high, 52-week high and 104-week high), following Baker et al. (2012). The red curve 
in each histogram below plots the normal distribution of the difference between offer 
premium and various target reference points. Except target 52-week high (histogram D), the 
average mean of normal distribution derives from zero. However, the offer premium centres 
on the target 52-week high, implying that target 52-week high is more accurate and reliable 
in gauging offer premium than other target reference points. For that reason, we employ the 
52-week high as the main reference point for the analysis of the paper. 
[Insert Figure1 About Here] 
 
5.1.2. Univariate analysis 
In this section, we undertake the univariate analysis and examine whether the relation 
between social connection and premium would be affected by the value of target reference 
points. Table 4 reports average premiums paid in deals classified by target 52-week high 
and social connection. Specifically, we divide the full sample into three quantiles (low, 
medium, high), depending on the degree of log percentage difference between the 52-week 
high share price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. The 
high quantile represents a large gap between the target recent price (four weeks before 
announcement) and peak price during the past 52 weeks. According to reference point 
theory (Baker et al., 2012), acquiring firms in the high quantile would negotiate the offer 
price by anchoring higher target reference points and therefore tend to pay higher 
premiums, while bidders in the low quantile are expected to pay lower premiums. We 
further split the full sample into non-connected deals and connected deals (including first-
degree and second-degree connected deals) and perform two-tailed t-test to examine the 
difference in premiums between pair-wise groups. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
In Table 4, we observe that the acquisition premium increases progressively from the low 
quantile to the high quantile, which supports the findings in Baker et al. (2012). For each 
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quantile, connected deals have lower average premiums than non-connected deals. The 
difference in average premiums between connected deals (Column 2) and non-connected 
deals (Column 5) is -7.39% in the medium quantile and -10.61% in the high quantile, both 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. However, we observe no significant 
difference in the low quantile. The findings support Hypothesis 2, which indicates that the 
social connection effect on premium is more pronounced when the target 52-week high 
price is high.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the premium paid in highly connected deals (first-degree 
connection; Column 3) is significantly less than the premium in non-connected deals 
(Column 5) in all quantiles of the target 52-week high. Moreover, acquirers pay lower 
premiums in first-degree connected deals (Column 3) than in deals with second-degree 
connection. The results above imply that inter-firm connection reduces acquisition 
premiums. The closer connection between acquirers and targets has a more negative impact, 
since acquirers gain greater information advantage in first-degree connected deals. 
 Overall, the univariate analysis provides preliminary results and suggests that premiums 
are negatively affected by social connection. This negative effect does not seem to be 
affected by the target’s 52-week high reference point.  
5.1.3. Multivariate analysis 
We further proceed with multivariate premium analysis to test the robustness of the 
previous finding. In Table 5, we regress acquisition premium against connection dummy 
variables (including variables for connection, first-degree connection and second-degree 
connection) which equal one if acquirers and targets are socially connected, and zero 
otherwise. Moreover, we introduce the target 52-week high as a reference point to gauge 
the anchoring effect in negotiation of premiums. Following Baker et al. (2012), we compute 
the log percentage difference of targets’ 52-week high and target price four weeks before 
the announcement. We also include common variables of firm and deal characteristics in 
previous M&A studies, such as Tobin’s Q (Officer, 2003; Schwert, 2000), relative size of 
the deal (Moeller et al., 2004), payment method, deal attitude (Schwert, 2000) and whether 
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the bid involves multiple bidders (Walkling & Edmister, 1985). Additionally, we control 
both year and industry fixed effects in all models. 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
In Models 1 and 2, social connection, especially first-degree connection, is significantly 
negatively associated with acquisition premium, suggesting that social linkage between 
merging parties could significantly reduce premiums. In particular, the coefficient for first-
degree connection is -0.4072 in Model 2, significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
The finding demonstrates that the existence of a first-degree connection reduces the 
acquisition premium. However, the relation between second-degree connection and 
premium is insignificant in all models. These findings are in accordance with Cai and 
Sevilir (2012), who suggest that targets in higher-connection deals obtain lower premiums. 
The results can be explained by the greater information advantage associated with first-
degree connections. Having a close connection with a target means that acquirers benefit 
from more accurate target information and enhance their bargaining power in the 
negotiation process. 
Consistent with Baker et al. (2012), we observe that the target 52-week high reference point 
is positively associated with the acquisition premium in Model 3. The findings confirm that 
higher target 52-week highs result in higher acquisition premiums paid to targets. The 
strong negative relation between premiums and connections, especially for first-degree 
connections, remains robust after controlling for the target 52-week high in Models 4 and 5. 
The coefficients of target 52-week high become insignificant in Models 4 and 5 with fixed 
effects included. The connection variables reduce the coefficient and significance level of 
target 52-week high from significance (0.0386, significant at 1% in Model 3) to 
insignificance (0.0145 in Model 4; 0.212 in Model 5). The findings support our hypothesis 
and indicate that social connection has stronger explanatory power than target reference 
point in premium analysis.  The findings could be attributed to the information advantage in 
the connection, especially in first-degree connections. The target reference point is public 
information for acquirers; therefore, it reflects limited target information. A first-degree 
connection largely reduces the information asymmetry between acquirers and targets, 
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resulting in acquirers better comprehending a target’s true value and having enhanced 
bargaining power in negotiations. Therefore, in connected deals, acquirers obtain more 
information about target valuation and could rely less on 52-week high to negotiate 
acquisition premium. Therefore, social connection, especially first-degree connection, 
outweighs the target reference point and plays a determining role in deciding premium. 
 
Moreover, the increase in relative deal size decreases acquisition premium, in line with 
Alexandridis et al. (2013).10 Premiums are higher in transactions financed with cash, tender 
offers (Schwert, 2000) or deals with lower target Tobin’s Q ratios (Bargeron, 
Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, 2008). 
 
To further disentangle the effect between connections and the target 52-week reference 
point, in Table 6 we further split the full sample into three quantiles (low, medium, high) 
according to the target 52-week reference points. We analyse the relation between 
acquisition premium and social connection in the subsample of Low/High target 52-week 
high. In Model 1 and Model 2, the dependent variable is the connection variable. In Model 
3 and Model 4, acquisition premium is regressed against first-degree and second-degree 
connections.  
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
Generally, the relation between premium and connection, especially first-degree 
connection, is more negative and significant in the subsample of high target 52-week highs 
than in the group with low target 52-week highs. In Model 4, the coefficient for first-degree 
connection is -0.3937 in the high quantile, significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient 
in the low quantile is -0.5089 and statistically insignificant. As expected in the second 
hypothesis, first-degree connection has more pronounced effects in deals with higher target 
52-week high reference points. Higher target 52-week high represents a larger gap between 
peak price and recent price of target firms.11 Compared with low target 52-week highs, a 
high 52-week high is more likely to deviate from target true value, resulting in higher 
                                                     
10 The negative relation could be attributed to lower competition for large takeover transactions (Gorton et al., 2009), leading to less 
pronounced “winner’s curse” (Alexandridis et al., 2010) and a lower probability of overpayment to targets (Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
11 Following Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is computed as the log percentage difference between 52-week high price, the recent 
peak price achieved by target firms, and target price at four weeks before the takeover announcement. 
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premiums paid. However, socially connected acquirers, particularly with a first-degree 
connection, could estimate firm value more accurately and negotiate a reasonable price due 
to their information advantage. Therefore, the negative impact of connection, particularly 
first-degree connection, is more pronounced in deals with a high reference point. 
5.2 Why do directors favour acquirers and why do targets accept lower premiums? 
The findings presented so far indicate that acquiring firms take over connected targets by 
paying lower premiums, especially when acquirers’ and targets’ boards share the same 
directors. According to agency theory, directors are recruited to represent shareholders’ 
interests and act as a monitoring device. While directors are in general influenced by the 
target 52-week high, in socially connected deals, managers are not as influenced by the 
reference point and accept significantly lower acquisition premiums. In this section, we 
explore why directors are more likely to favour acquirers and why target boards are willing 
to be acquired with a low offer premium, and we try to explain the incentive from the 
seniority and retention point of view. 
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
5.2.1 Seniority impact on premium 
In Table 7, we provide the univariate and multivariate evidence on the seniority and 
retention of connected directors and investigate the impact on premium. We first examine 
the positions of connected directors in acquisition partners and classify interlocking 
directors’ board positions both in the acquirer and target firms (or connected directors in the 
second-degree connected deals, respectively from acquirers and targets) into the following 
categories: CEO, Chairman, independent director or common director.12. The first level 
includes the CEO and Chairman roles, while the second level includes the common 
directors and independent directors. Higher-level positions for acquirers (targets) indicate 
that the interlocking director holds a more important position in the acquirer (target) than in 
the target (acquirer). In our sample, 14.91% of connected directors hold higher positions 
and have more power in acquiring firms than in targets, while 66.67% of connected 
                                                     
12 In first-degree connected deals, board members who serve on both acquirer and target boards are called “interlocking directors”. 
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directors have the same level of board position in acquirers and targets. In first-degree 
connected deals, 33.33% of interlocking directors hold more important positions in 
acquirers, while 48.48% of interlocking directors are in positions at the same level.  
Panel A lists the average premium in transactions classified by the seniority of connected 
directors. Two-tailed t-test is employed to examine the difference in average premiums 
between pair-wise groups. In general, acquirers pay significantly lower premium when 
connected directors hold the same level or a more important position in bidding firms, 
especially when acquirers and targets share interlocking directors. In first-degree connected 
deals, the acquisition premium is on average 13.17% when the director holds a higher and 
more powerful position in acquirers, while acquisition premium is 46.94% when directors 
hold a higher-level board seat in the target, indicating that directors favour firms in which 
they dominate. Acquisition premium is on average 28.20% in takeover deals in which 
directors hold positions at the same level as in acquisition partners, indicating that directors are 
prone to protecting acquirers’ interests. In Panel C of Table 7, the first four models regress 
premium on the independent variables related to seniority.13 The coefficients of A_higher 
position are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that premium 
would be largely reduced when connected directors hold a higher position in acquirers. The 
results of multivariate analysis support the seniority hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). The 
findings could be explained by interlocking directors having stronger organisational 
identification in firms where the hold higher-level positions and therefore would contribute 
more important resources and valuable advice to the firms (Hillman et al., 2006; 
Shropshire, 2010). Therefore, interlocking directors who serve as CEO/Chairman in 
acquirers would favour bidding firms and negotiate lower premiums.  
5.2.2 Retention effect on premium 
Next, we investigate the retention of connected directors and its relation with premium. In 
first-degree connected deals, we find that all interlocking directors who serve in both 
acquirer and target firms continue to stay on the new board of combined firms after the 
acquisition, since interlocking directors have better understanding in both acquirers and 
                                                     
13 A_higher position refers to a  situation where connected directors hold a higher-level position in bidding firms, while A_T same level 
position refers to connected directors in acquirers who serve in the same level positions as in target firms. 
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targets and therefore could facilitate and accelerate the post-merger integration process (Li 
& Aguilera, 2008). In second-degree connected deals, target directors share experience 
(education, employment, etc.) with acquirer directors. In general, target directors are not 
likely to could continue to serve on the new board after takeovers are completed (Harford, 
2003). However, in second-degree connected deals, 33.33% of target connected directors 
are retained on the board of the combined firm following takeover deals, implying that 
social connections with the acquirer’s board plays an essential role in target directors’ 
staying or leaving.  
Panel B of Table 7 shows that acquirers that retain target connected directors pay lower 
acquisition premium (30.12%). 14  In second-degree connected deals, retention of target 
directors would reduce premium by 6.26% on average. These findings are in line with 
retention hypothesis, in which bidding firms pay lower premiums when retaining connected 
target directors. The conclusion is further supported by Model 5 and Model 6 in Panel C of 
Table 7. We observe a strong and negative relation between premium and the retention 
variable. The results can be explained by the fact that target directors may put their interests 
before shareholders’. 
Harford (2003) documents that target boards would resist takeover bids or charge high 
acquisition premiums to compensate for their financial, information or network loss due to 
the loss of directorship. However, directors may compromise and neglect target 
shareholders’ interest when their self-interest is satisfied. Similarly, Wang et al. (2010) 
provide evidence that target directors sacrifice shareholders’ interests and accept lower 
acquisition premiums in exchange for directorship in combined firms. Moving to the board 
of the new combined firm would signal directors’ high quality and expertise, resulting in 
more job opportunities. For retained directors, accepting low acquisition premiums can be 
regarded as protecting future shareholders’ interest. Additionally, social links with acquirers 
would increase the likelihood of retention for target directors due to the familiarity effect 
(Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2008; Cooney et al., 2015; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 
2007). Therefore, connected directors have more incentive to compromise on deal items in 
                                                     
14 In first-degree connected deals, all the interlocking directors are retained in the newly combined firms. Therefore, we do not show the 
univariate analysis of premium for first-degree connected deals. 
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order to secure board seats and favour the interest of future shareholders.  
Taken together, retaining connected directors is associated with low acquisition premiums 
and confirms that connected board directors in target firms have a strong incentive to 
complete acquisition even at the cost of shareholders’ interest.  
5.3. Alternative Proxy for Social Connection 
El-Khatib et al. (2015) adopt CEO centrality to study the relation between acquisitions and 
within-firms’ social connection; they indicate that takeover activities are strongly 
influenced by CEO centrality. 15  Therefore, we employ an alternative proxy between 
acquirers and targets as a robustness analysis for takeover premium. We reclassify the 
cross-firm connection into only CEO connections. Specifically, CEO connections refer to 
instances when acquirer or target CEOs act as a go-between for bidding firms and targets. 
CEO connections are further split into CEO first-degree connections, in which the acquirer 
(target) CEO also works as a target (acquirer) board or management member. CEO 
connections are classified as second-degree if the acquirer or target CEO shares past 
experience with board members or executives in the counterpart firm. 
Table 8 reports the relation between acquisition premium and CEO connection, including 
first-degree and second-degree connections. We also introduce the reference point – target 
52-week high – in Model 2 and Model 4. In Model 5 and Model 6, we split the full sample 
into three quantiles (low, medium, high) and analyse the impact of CEO connection on 
acquisition premium in the subsample of low/high target 52-week highs. We control both 
year and industry fixed effects in all models.16 
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
We observe that the coefficient for CEO connection is -0.3117, significant at 5%, while the 
coefficient for CEO first-degree connection is -0.5075, significant at 1% with target 52-
week high controlled. The findings support the hypothesis of CEO connection and suggest 
                                                     
15 CEOs with higher centrality negatively affect acquisition performance. CEO centrality qualifies the strength and importance of the 
CEO within top management in the aspects of performance, decision-making and dedication. Higher CEO centrality implies that the CEO 
plays a more essential and powerful role within the organisation. 
16 We also test all models without year and industry effects and find the same results; the results remain robust. 
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that acquisition premium is strikingly reduced by CEO connection, especially first-degree 
connection. In Models 5 and 6, we find that the coefficients for the CEO connection 
variable are more significant when takeover deals are in the high quantile of target 52-week 
high. The coefficient for CEO first-degree connection is -0.8295 (insignificant) in the 
subsample of low target 52-week highs, and is -1.0470 (significant at 1%) in the subsample 
of high target 52-week highs. The results reveal that CEO connection, especially first-
degree, is more pronounced in the high reference point subsample. This indicates that CEOs 
with connections, especially first-degree connections, are not anchored by the target’s 
reference point and indeed pay lower premiums. 
5.4. Method of Payment 
Previous findings indicate that acquirers could benefit from social connection, and their 
resulting higher information advantage, by paying lower premiums to targets. In this 
section, we further explore whether bidders could exploit this information advantage and 
the close relationships they have with target firms in other aspects. We investigate whether 
social connection would have an effect on the method of payment.  
[Insert Table 9 About Here] 
In Table 9, we employ logit regressions to address the relation between social connection 
and medium of payment. The dependent variable is a stock dummy which is equal to one if 
deals are fully paid with stock. The explanatory variable includes connection (in Model 1 
and Model 2), first-degree connection and second-degree connection (in Model 3 and 
Model 4 respectively). The models also include the other control variables, year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects. 
 In general, all the models show striking relations between the medium of payment and 
variables representing connection. The coefficients for connection are positive and salient 
in Model 1 and Model 2, implying that bidders in connected deals are prone to finance bids 
with their own stock. In Model 4 with fixed effects controlled, stock deals are positively 
associated with first- and second-degree connections, significant at the 1% level. Moreover, 
the coefficients for first-degree connection (0.8662 in Model 4) are greater than those for 
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second-degree (0.7159 in Model 4), indicating that a closer connection has a bigger impact 
on the choice of payment medium. Therefore, acquirers with a first-degree connection tend 
to choose stock to pay for takeover activities. The findings are consistent with our 
hypothesis. 
Acquirers may choose equity as a payment method due to ownership structure and 
contingent effects. In stock offers, target shareholders are concerned with overvaluation of 
acquirers (Martynova & Renneboog, 2009; Travlos, 1987). Bidding firms take longer to 
negotiate and complete transactions paid with stock (Golubov et al., 2012). Social 
connection between acquirers and targets, especially first-degree connection, reduces the 
two-sided information asymmetry, increases trust and enables target shareholders to 
accurately value bidders’ stocks. Therefore, targets are more likely to accept equity 
payment in socially connected deals. Moreover, target boards or management would accept 
stock offers in exchange for shares and voting power of combined firms. Connection with 
acquirers increases the likelihood of retention, therefore leading to a higher probability of 
acceptance of stock payment.  
5.5 Robustness check 
5.5.1 Endogeneity test  
In this section, we employ the two-stage-least-square (2SLS) procedure to address possible 
endogeneity problems concerning bid premium. We select instrumental variables (IVs) that 
relate to the key connection variables but do not directly influence the error component in 
the models. The objective is to avoid correlation between independent variables and the 
residuals in OLS regressions. Specifically, the instrument is whether a social connection 
existed between acquirers and targets three years before the announcement. Since an M&A 
deal is usually not prepared three years in advance, the connection built three years before 
does not serve the purpose of acquisition. Therefore, we expect that this instrumental 
variable has no impact on our dependent variable (acquisition premium), but directly affects 
the connection variables. 
[Insert Table 10 About Here] 
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We consider connections three years before the announcement as the instrumental variable 
for connection in previous OLS regressions, first-degree connection three years before for 
first-degree connection and second-degree connection three years before for second-degree 
connection. Table 10 shows both the first and second stages of the endogeneity test. 
Following Politis and Romano (1994), we apply the resampling technique – stationary 
bootstrap  to estimate standard errors and confidence intervals in order to address the 
potential issue of stationary and weakly dependent observations. The observations are 
resampled in the block of random length, where the length of each block is distributed with 
a geometric distribution with mean b. We control year and industry fixed effects in all 
models. In Model 2 and Model 4, we also include target 52-week high. The endogeneity 
results lead to similar conclusions as in previous sections. We still find a negative impact of 
social connection, especially first-degree connection, on acquisition premium. The 
coefficient for first-degree connection is negative and statistically significant at 1%, even 
with target 52-week high controlled in Model 4. Moreover, we proceed with the Hausman 
test to further check for the endogeneity when the independent variable is connection (any 
connection), first-degree connection and second-degree connection. The null hypothesis for 
the Hausman test is that the connection variable is exogenous. The p-value of the Hausman 
test is 0.5401 when connection (any connection) is the regressor, while the p-value is 
0.2581 when first-degree connection and second-degree connection are independent 
variables. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the connection variables are 
exogenous.   
5.5.2 Alternative indicators for reference points 
In order to fully compare the impact of social connection with psychological anchoring 
effect, we also include target peak price over various horizons as alternative indicators for 
target reference points.  Following Baker et al. (2012), we adopt target 13-week high, 26-
week high, 39-week high and 104-week high as alternative reference points. Similar to 
target 52-week high, X-week high is calculated as the log percentage difference of the 
target’s X-week high share price over the share price four weeks before the M&A deal 
announcement. 
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[Insert Table 11 About Here] 
Table 11 represents the multivariate analysis with alternative reference points. We divide 
the full sample into three quantiles (low, medium, high) based on various target reference 
points and then test the relation between connection and premium in the subsample of 
low/high target reference points. We observe that first-degree connection exerts a strong 
and negative effect on offer premium in the high quantile of alternative reference points, 
while no significant relation is found in the low quantile. The findings are consistent with 
the results with target 52-week high as the reference point (Table 5) and confirm that the 
negative effect of first-degree connection is more pronounced in the high quantile of 
reference points. By anchoring high reference points (peak price of target firms), bidders 
are more likely to pay higher premiums and more likely to deviate from target true value. 
Acquirers with a first-degree connection have better access to target true value and better 
bargaining power in the negotiation; therefore, they pay reasonable lower offer prices, 
especially in deals with higher target reference points. Considering all analyses, the evidence 
shows that connection plays a determining role in pricing target firms and negotiating 
premiums.  
 
5.5.3 Propensity score matching 
In this section, we employ the propensity score matching (PSM) method to reduce the 
potential selection bias. Propensity score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) is a 
statistical method to estimate the treatment effects and reduce bias in non-randomised 
observational studies.17 In PSM, the treatment group is matched with the control group, 
which is not assigned to the certain condition but has similar characteristics and similar 
values of propensity score as the treatment group. Herein, we adopt propensity score 
matching (PSM) to evaluate the connection effect in premiums. The treatment group is the 
sample of connected deals or deals with first-degree connection, while the control group 
(untreated or comparison group) is the group of deals with no social ties but with similar 
                                                     
17 Treatment effects refer to the effect of a particular condition, such as policy, smoke, education, etc. The treatment group is the group 
which is assigned the condition. 
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corporate fundamentals and deal characteristics. Specifically, we adopt Nearest Neighbor 
(NN) matching as the matching algorithm to obtain the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) (Imbens, 2004).18 ATT compares the outcome between treated and untreated 
units in the matched sample. In this paper, the ATT measures the difference in premiums 
between connected deals and a comparable non-connected sample which has similar values 
of propensity score.  
[Insert Table 12 About Here] 
Table 12 shows the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for connected deals and 
comparison groups. Moreover, we apply the bootstrap method to estimate the standard error 
and confidence interval. In Panel 1a and Panel 1b, the treatment group is the deals in which 
acquirers are socially tied with targets. The control group in Panel 1a and Panel 1b is the 
group of matched non-connected deals with similar firm deal characteristics. The difference 
between Panel 1a and Panel 1b is whether to include the target reference point in the 
baseline characteristics. Panel 2a and Panel 2b show the impact of first-degree connection 
on acquisition premium. Likewise, we consider the target reference point – target 52-week 
high – as one covariate variable to calculate the propensity score for the control group in 
Panel 2b. Panel 1a shows the premium in the treatment group is 20.3% less (significant at 
the 10% level) than the premium in the control group, while the premium difference is 
insignificant in Panel 1b. In Panel 2a and Panel 2b, ATT is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The premium in the treatment group is 15.3%, significantly less 
than the premium in the comparison group in Panel 2a, while the difference of premium is 
larger, at 25.3% between the treated and untreated groups in Panel 2b. The findings suggest 
that first-degree connection exerts a strong and negative influence in premium even after 
controlling target reference point as a baseline characteristic. The results with propensity 
score matching further support our previous finding that connection, especially first-degree 
connection, largely reduces acquisition premiums. The negative effect of first-degree 
connection is not affected by the psychological reference points. 
 
                                                     
18 As a robustness check, we also adopt Stratifying matching and Kernel matching as matching algorithms to compute ATT and find 
similar results.   
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6. Conclusion 
With a US sample from 2001 to 2016, we focus on the influence of cross-firm social 
connections on acquisition premium during takeover activities. Our findings support the 
view that bidding firms socially connected to targets pay lower acquisition premiums. The 
savings in premiums would be larger when the two merging firms share the same board 
members or executives (that is, a first-degree social connection). To disentangle whether 
social connections are more related to better information flow or a familiarity bias, we 
introduce reference point theory (Baker et al., 2012) as an additional testing framework. 
Acquirers in first-degree connected deals would rely more on information advantages to 
value the target, rather than the reference point – target 52-week high. Moreover, connected 
directors who are invited to participate in the new board of the new firm have stronger 
personal incentives to compromise on low acquisition premiums, at the cost of target 
shareholders’ interest. After reclassifying social connection into CEO connection, we find 
that bid premiums are largely reduced when either the target or acquirer CEO links the two 
merging firms. The results indicate that CEO connection is more efficient and valuable than 
board connection in affecting takeover activities. 
Further, favourable acquisition timing and payment method for acquirers could partially 
explain the negative relation between social connection and acquisition premium. We 
identify that acquirers in connected deals tend to take over targets when their own stocks 
are highly valued and when the recent target price is far less than the target’s highest price 
over the previous year. Therefore, acquirers are prone to finance acquisitions with equity, 
due to overvalued stocks. 
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Figure 1: Histogram of difference between acquisition premium and target reference point 
 
Figure 1 presents the density of offer premium relative to target reference point. Following Baker et al. (2012), we adopt peak price of target firms over different horizons (13 
weeks, 26 weeks, 39 weeks, 52 weeks and 104 weeks). X-week high is calculated as the log percentage difference of the target's X-week high share price over the share price 
four weeks before the M&A deal announcement. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price and the target’s share price four 
weeks before the deal announcement. Each histogram plots the density of the difference between premium and target reference point. 
 
Histogram A: Target 13-week high                               Histogram B: Target 26-week high                               Histogram C: Target 39-week high 
                            
 
Histogram D: Target 52-week high                                                             Histogram E: Target 104-week high 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 illustrates our complete sample of 1,502 US M&A deals by year and industry of the acquiring 
company. Industries are classified according to the Fama-French 12-industry categories. Hereby, we 
classify our sample by the acquirer’s SIC code. We consider deals where acquirer and target are quoted 
US companies. The full sample is displayed first, followed by the classification of connected or non-
connected deals. A connected deal can be based on a first- or second-degree connection. A non-
connected deal shows no evidence of any social connection. For each classification, we first report the 
number of deals per year followed by the number of deals per year by the total number of deals. This is 
done for each classification separately, and the ratio is reported as a percentage. 
 
Panel A: Deals per Year 
Year  
Full sample  Connected deals  Non-connected deals  
Number  Percentage   Number  Percentage   Number  Percentage  
2001 144 9.59% 14 6.14% 130 10.20% 
2002 88 5.86% 11 4.82% 77 6.04% 
2003 124 8.26% 13 5.70% 111 8.71% 
2004 120 7.99% 8 3.51% 112 8.79% 
2005 102 6.79% 12 5.26% 90 7.06% 
2006 107 7.12% 9 3.95% 98 7.69% 
2007 93 6.19% 16 7.02% 77 6.04% 
2008 73 4.86% 10 4.39% 63 4.95% 
2009 63 4.19% 13 5.70% 50 3.92% 
2010 73 4.86% 9 3.95% 64 5.02% 
2011 46 3.06% 8 3.51% 38 2.98% 
2012 36 2.40% 3 1.32% 33 2.59% 
2013 97 6.46% 27 11.84% 70 5.49% 
2014 122 8.12% 23 10.09% 99 7.77% 
2015 141 9.39% 34 14.91% 107 8.40% 
2016 73 4.86% 18 7.89% 55 4.32% 
Total  1502 100.00% 228 100.00% 1274 100.00% 
       Panel B: Deals per Industry 
Fama-French industry 
classification (12) 
Full sample  Connected deals  Non-connected deals  
Number  Percentage   Number  Percentage  Number  Percentage  
Consumer NonDurables  40 2.66% 4 1.75% 36 2.83% 
Consumer Durables  14 0.93% 3 1.32% 11 0.86% 
Manufacturing  71 4.73% 16 7.02% 55 4.32% 
Energy, Oil, Gas and Coal 61 4.06% 16 7.02% 45 3.53% 
Chemicals  21 1.40% 6 2.63% 15 1.18% 
Business Equipment  361 24.03% 58 25.44% 303 23.78% 
Telephone and Television  40 2.66% 5 2.19% 35 2.75% 
Utilities  38 2.53% 16 7.02% 22 1.73% 
Wholesale and Retail  61 4.06% 9 3.95% 52 4.08% 
Healthcare and Med. Equip 180 11.98% 27 11.84% 153 12.01% 
Finance 516 34.35% 52 22.81% 464 36.42% 
Other 99 6.59% 16 7.02% 83 6.51% 
Total  1502 100.00% 228 100.00% 1274 100.00% 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for our complete sample of 1,502 US M&A transactions between 2001 and 2016. We restrict the M&A deals by the following criteria: 
We only consider completed M&A deals where both acquirer and target are quoted companies with a deal value of at least $10 million and where the acquirer obtained more 
than 50% ownership of the target. Furthermore, the data for both the acquirer and target companies need to be available from CRSP and COMPUSTAT. We break down our 
variables into three panels: Panel A reports acquirer related firm characteristics, Panel B reports target related firm characteristics and Panel C reports common deal related 
characteristics. First, we present the values for the full sample. Next, we sub-divide our sample based on the presence and degree of social connections. For brevity, we 
include the CEO when mentioning the board of directors. A connection is present if at least one director from the acquiring firm has a first- or second-degree connection with 
at least one of the directors from the target firm. A first-degree connection, also known as board interlocks, happens if a director serves simultaneously on the acquirer’s and 
target’s boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A second-degree connection requires a social tie between two directors at the deal announcement of acquirer and target, 
respectively. This connection may be formed through any historical path, for instance employment, education or social clubs. The remaining deals are defined as non-
connected M&A transactions. All denoted variables are specifically defined in Appendix A. Two-tailed t-test is employed to examine the difference of variable in means 
between connected and non-connected deals. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Variables 
Full sample (І) Connected deals  (ΙΙ) Unconnected deals (ΙΙΙ) (ΙΙ) - (ΙΙΙ) 
Mean  Standard deviation Mean  Standard deviation  Mean  Standard deviation  Difference 
Panel A: Acquirer related                
Tobin's Q  3.2583 11.5772 4.0544 12.0221 3.1164 11.4960 0.9381** 
Market Value ($millions)  19835.39 45473.69 23400.81 46778.20 19213.38 45233.45 4187.44*** 
Leverage  0.3830 0.2927 0.3983 0.2958 0.3803 0.2922 0.0180  
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0256 0.1571 0.0377 0.1069 0.0235 0.1645 0.0143** 
Acquirer run-up 0.0973 0.3524 0.1622 0.3960 0.0888 0.3441 0.0734** 
Panel B: Target related                
Tobin's Q  2.7862 9.2032 2.6921 5.9876 2.8033 9.6739 -0.1112* 
Market Value ($millions)  1664.18 5069.07 2848.98 6467.88 1454.79 4752.40 1394.20*** 
Leverage  37.48% 1.1145 36.89% 0.3382 37.59% 1.2009 -0.70% 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.0890 1.4583 -0.0233 0.2091 -0.1007996 1.5813 7.75%* 
Target run-up 0.1036 1.6957 0.0807 0.5147 0.1078 1.8291 -0.0271 
Panel C: Deal related               
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Transaction value ($millions)  2,148.43 6,328.85 3,537.58 8,139.58 1,899.04 5,915.28 1638.55*** 
Premium (%) 39.22% 0.3380 33.68% 0.2910 40.21% 0.3449 -6.53%*** 
Time to resolution (in days) 130.1262 79.2904 145.2061 101.9994 127.4189 74.2111 17.7872*** 
52-week high (%)  63.44% 2.2929 46.57% 0.9865 66.42% 2.4516 -19.85% 
Relative deal size  0.3333 0.4692 0.4153 0.6166 0.3213 0.4373 0.0940*** 
Hostile takeover 1.07% 0.0107 0.88% 0.0935 1.10% 0.1045 -0.23% 
Competing bid 4.14% 0.1993 4.39% 0.2052 4.09% 0.1982 0.29% 
Pure cash deal  39.45% 0.4889 35.09% 0.4783 40.24% 0.4906 -5.15% 
Pure stock deal  24.49% 0.4302 31.58% 0.4659 23.20% 0.4223 8.38%*** 
Diversification 29.37% 0.4556 27.19% 0.4459 29.76% 0.4574 -2.57% 
Tender offer  17.82% 0.3828 18.86% 0.3920 17.64% 0.3813 1.22% 
Number of observations 1502 228 1274   
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Table 3 – Correlation matrix 
 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix and shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for each pair of variables in this study. All denoted variables are specifically defined in 
Appendix A. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Correlation Matrix Premium 
First-degree 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
First-degree 
CEO 
Connection 
Second-degree 
CEO Connection 
First-degree 
Board 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Board 
Connection 
Target 52-
week high 
First-Degree Connection -0.0947*** 
       
Second-Degree Connection -0.0146 -0.0799*** 
      
First-degree CEO Connection -0.0916*** 0.7511*** -0.0386 
     
Second-degree CEO 
Connection 
-0.0504* 0.0698*** 0.4907*** -0.0354 
    
First-degree Board 
Connection 
-0.0440* 0.7396*** -0.0480* 0.3302*** 0.1137*** 
   
Second-degree Board 
Connection 
0.0128 -0.012 0.8235*** 0.0157 0.0468* -0.0522** 
  
Target 52-week high 0.1190*** 0.0069 -0.0488* -0.001 -0.0228 0.0104 -0.0331 
 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0231 -0.0034 0.0245 -0.0031 -0.0081 -0.0066 0.0304 0.0145 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0234 0.0108 -0.0092 0.0012 0.0029 0.0128 -0.0082 0.0186 
Transaction Value -0.1433*** -0.0161 0.2295*** -0.0232 0.1379*** -0.0079 0.1861*** -0.1546*** 
Relative Deal Size -0.1493*** -0.0009 0.0906*** 0.0001 0.0518* 0.0112 0.0634** 0.006 
Pure Cash Deal 0.1590*** -0.0283 -0.0462* -0.0292 -0.0694*** -0.0287 -0.0219 -0.0483 
Pure Stock Deal -0.1122*** 0.0796*** 0.0278 0.0927*** 0.1103*** 0.0529** -0.0026 0.1024*** 
Hostile 0.0521* 0.0114 -0.0211 -0.017 0.0089 0.0261 -0.0128 0.0231 
Tender 0.1523*** 0.0188 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0333 0.0294 0.0259 0.0647** 
Competing Bid 0.0566** -0.0089 0.0088 -0.0129 0.0037 -0.0107 0.0093 0.0147 
Diversification 0.0076 0.0154 -0.0329 0.0326 -0.0261 0.0136 -0.0135 -0.0254 
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Correlation Matrix 
Acquirer 
Tobin's Q  
Acquirer 
Run-up 
Target 
Tobin's Q  
Transaction 
Value 
Relative 
Deal Size 
Pure Cash 
Deal 
Pure Stock 
Deal 
Hostile Tender 
Competing 
Bid 
Target Tobin's Q  0.0376 -0.0063         
Transaction Value 0.0578** 0.0464 0.1016***        
Relative Deal Size -0.0183 0.0170 -0.0202 0.2478***       
Pure Cash Deal 0.0356 -0.0863*** 0.0287 -0.0698*** -0.2967***      
Pure Stock Deal 0.0011 0.0814***  -0.0217 -0.0998*** 0.0992*** -0.4597***     
Hostile -0.0076 -0.0174 -0.0278 -0.0013 0.0131 0.0011 -0.0263    
Tender 0.03 -0.0222 0.0193 0.0112 -0.1441*** 0.3560*** -0.2060*** 0.1722***   
Competing Bid -0.0209 0.0254 0.0007 0.1068*** 0.0511* 0.0383 -0.0564* 0.1088*** 0.1309***  
Diversification -0.0119 0.0041 -0.0186 0.0369 -0.0647** 0.1636*** -0.0805*** 0.0043 0.0405 -0.0089 
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Table 4 – Acquisition Premium Analysis and Reference Point 
Table 4 compares the impact of social connections and reference point hypothesis on acquisition premiums. Depending on the degree of our calculated 52-week high 
variables, we divide our sample into three quantiles (low, medium, high). Next, we present the values for the full sample and sub-divide our sample based on the presence and 
degree of social connections. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price and the target’s share price four weeks before the 
deal announcement. According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is computed as the log percentage difference between the 52-week high share price and the target’s 
share price four weeks before the deal announcement. A connection is present if the acquirer’s directors form a first- or second-degree social connection with the target’s 
directors. A first-degree connection, also known as board interlocks, is considered if a director simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the 
announcement of the M&A deal. A second-degree connection requires a social tie between two directors from both target and acquiring firms at the deal announcement, 
respectively. The remaining deals are defined as non-connected M&A transactions. Two-tailed t-test is employed to examine the difference of premium between pair-wise 
groups. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Premium 
Full Sample  
Connected 
deals 
First-degree 
connected 
Second-degree 
connected 
Non-connected 
deals  
Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) - (5) (3) - (5) (4) - (5) (3) - (4) 
52-Week high                   
Low 30.16% 27.66% 15.40% 30.61% 30.60% -2.94% -15.20%*** 0.01% -15.21%** 
Medium 35.19% 28.90% 25.80% 30.31% 36.29% -7.39%** -10.49%*** -5.98% -4.51%* 
High 51.49% 42.49% 36.85% 46.44% 53.10% -10.61%** -16.25%*** -6.66% -9.59%* 
                    
Observations 1502 228 66 162 1274         
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Table 5 – Determinants of the acquisition premium 
 
Table 5 reports the multivariate analysis for acquisition premium. In all models, acquisition premium is 
regressed against a dummy variable indicating whether the acquirer and target firms are socially 
connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price 
and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. Further, we differentiate 
between first- and second-degree connections. The independent variable in Model 1 and Model 4 is 
Connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are socially connected with targets. The independent 
variable in Model 3 is target 52-week high, log percentage difference of the target’s 52-week high 
share price to evaluate the anchoring effect. The independent variables in Model 2 and Model 5 are 
first-degree connection and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection happens if a director 
simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A 
second-degree connection requires a social tie between a director from the acquirer’s board and a 
director from the target’s board. This connection may be formed through any historical path, for 
instance employment, education or social clubs. Furthermore, we use the log percentage difference of 
the target’s 52-week high share price from Baker et al. (2012) in Model 4 and Model 5. In addition, we 
control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all models, we control for 
industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, we do not report the results for the industry and year 
dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Connection -0.2724***   
-0.2691*** 
 
 
(-2.67) 
  
(-2.64) 
 
First-degree connection  
-0.4072*** 
  
-0.4045*** 
 
 
(-2.72) 
  
(-2.64) 
Second-degree connection   
0.0213 
  
0.0227 
 
 
(0.29) 
  
(0.29) 
Target 52-week high    
0.0386*** 0.0145 0.0212 
 
  
(3.19) (1.01) (1.30) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 
(-0.29) (0.58) (-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.06) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0044 -0.0035*** -0.0033 -0.0043 -0.0034** 
 
(-1.39) (-2.64) (-1.24) (-1.36) (-2.45) 
Relative deal size  -0.1659* -0.1386** -0.1564** -0.1663* -0.1516** 
 
(-1.91) (-2.25) (-2.50) (-1.92) (-2.38) 
Pure cash deal  0.0683 0.1495** 0.1280** 0.0757 0.1551** 
 
(0.86) (2.42) (2.00) (0.94) (2.48) 
Hostile takeover -0.7180 0.4038 0.4475* -0.7059 0.4285 
 
(-1.41) (1.43) (1.69) (-1.37) (1.63) 
Tender offer  -0.0060 0.0734 0.0976 -0.0027 0.0661 
 
(-0.06) (1.03) (1.24) (-0.03) (0.90) 
Competing bid 0.0160 0.1297 0.1037 0.0113 0.1136 
 
(0.10) (0.99) (0.85) (0.07) (0.85) 
Diversification -0.0355 -0.0204 -0.0291 -0.0327 -0.0152 
 
(-0.48) (-0.36) (-0.48) (-0.44) (-0.26) 
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Constant -0.8775*** -1.0568*** -1.2695*** -0.9091*** -1.0876*** 
 
(-3.86) (-10.40) (-8.95) (-3.96) (-10.23) 
 
  
 
  
Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.089 0.068 0.085 0.087 
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Table 6 – Acquisition premium analysis in subsamples of low/high target 52-week high 
Table 6 reports the multivariate analysis for acquisition premium in subsamples of low/high target 52-
week high. Target 52-week high is the target's 52-week high share price, computed as log percentage 
difference of the target’s share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement. The full sample 
is split into three groups based on the target 52-week high. The low group in Model 1 and Model 3 
refers to the subsample in which the deals have the lowest target 52-week high, while the high group in 
Model 2 and Model 4 is the subsample in which the deals have the highest target 52-week high. In all 
models, acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable indicating if the acquirer and target 
firms are socially connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference 
between offer price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. Further, we 
differentiate between first- and second-degree connections. The independent variable in Model 1 and 
Model 2 is Connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are socially connected with targets. The 
dependent variables in Model 3 and Model 4 are first-degree connection and second-degree connection. 
A first-degree connection happens if a director simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s 
boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A second-degree connection requires a social tie 
between a director from the acquirer’s board and a director from the target’s board. This connection 
may be formed through any historical path, for instance employment, education or social clubs. In 
addition, we control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all models, we 
control for industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, we do not report the results for the industry and 
year dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics 
are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
Acquisition premium 
Low  High  Low  High  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
  
   Connection 0.0521 -0.1958**   
 
(0.50) (-2.14) 
  
First-degree connection   
-0.5089 -0.3937*** 
 
  
(-1.36) (-3.31) 
Second-degree connection    
0.1676 -0.0594 
 
  
(1.55) (-0.50) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0064 -0.0016* 0.0056 -0.0017* 
 
(1.03) (-1.74) (0.91) (-1.85) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0013 -0.0058*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** 
 
(-1.03) (-2.85) (-1.05) (-2.67) 
Relative deal size  -0.1918** -0.0864 -0.2062** -0.0992 
 
(-2.13) (-0.95) (-2.30) (-1.12) 
Pure cash deal  0.1178 0.1493* 0.1338 0.1523* 
 
(1.14) (1.79) (1.34) (1.84) 
Hostile takeover 0.5269 0.3415* 0.5358 0.3542* 
 
(1.43) (1.74) (1.49) (1.78) 
Tender offer -0.0566 0.1132 -0.0684 0.1148 
 
(-0.46) (1.25) (-0.57) (1.26) 
Competing bid 0.2631 -0.0490 0.2967* -0.0563 
 
(1.53) (-0.26) (1.71) (-0.30) 
Diversification -0.0210 -0.0601 -0.0227 -0.0634 
 
(-0.24) (-0.76) (-0.26) (-0.80) 
47 
 
Constant -0.8192*** -0.5186** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** 
 
(-3.58) (-2.49) (-3.68) (-2.59) 
 
  
   Year-fixed-effects yes yes Yes yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  yes yes Yes yes 
Observations 751 751 751 751 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.075 0.067 0.078 
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Table 7 – Explain low premium for connected deals 
 
Table 7 explores why acquisition premium is associated with social connection using three panels. Panel A shows univariate analysis for low premium in the connected deals, 
first-degree connected deals and second-degree connected deals, which are further classified by directors’ position on the board of acquisition partners. We divide board 
position into first-level (CEO; Chairman) and second-level (common director; independent director). A_higher position refers to interlocking directors with a higher position 
in the acquirer board than the target board. A_same level position is where an interlocking director is CEO/Chairman of both acquirer and target, or is hired as a common 
director or independent director of the acquisition partner. T_higher position indicates that an interlocking director has a higher position (CEO/Chairman) in the acquirer than 
the target. Panel B limits the sample to second-degree connected deals. In Panel B, we classify the sample by whether a target director is retained on the board of the 
combined firm after acquisition. Panel C lists multivariate analysis for low premium. Model 1 and Model 2 report regressions for deals with a connection. Model 3 and Model 
4 show the results of first-degree connection. The dependent variables in all the models are acquisition premium, computed as the log percentage difference between offer 
price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. A_higher position is a dummy variable which equals one when interlocking directors have a 
higher board position in the acquirer than the target, and zero otherwise. A_same position is a dummy variable which equals one when an interlocking director has the same 
level position in the acquirer as in the target, and zero otherwise. In Model 5 and Model 6, the independent variable is T_retain, a dummy variable which equals one when a 
target director is offered a board seat on the board of the combined firm. Model 2, Model 4 and Model 6 control both year and industry fixed-effects. For brevity, we do not 
report the results for the industry and year dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Two-tailed t-test is employed to examine the 
difference of premium between pair-wise groups in Panel A and Panel B. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Premium for Seniority 
  Connected deal  A_higher position A_T same level  T_higher position Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (4) (3) - (4) (2) - (3) 
Premium  33.68% 27.88% 34.78% 39.36% -11.48%** -4.58%* -6.90% 
Observations 228 34 142 52       
  First-degree connected A_higher position A_T same level  T_higher position Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (4) (3) - (4) (2) - (3) 
Premium  28.88% 13.17% 28.20% 46.94% -19.06%*** -6.18%** -15.04%** 
Observations 66 22 32 12       
  Second-degree connected A_higher position A_T same level  T_higher position Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (4) (3) - (4) (2) - (3) 
Premium  35.64% 29.36% 37.29% 35.91% -6.54% -1.39% -6.54% 
Observations 162 12 110 40       
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Panel B: Univariate analysis of Premium for retention  
  Connected deal Retain Non-retain Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) 
premium  33.68% 30.12% 40.07% -9.95%*** 
Observations 228 120 108   
  Second-degree connected Retain Non-retain Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) 
premium  35.64% 31.46% 37.73% -6.26%** 
Observations 162 54 108   
 
 
Panel C: Multivariate analysis of Premium for seniority and retention 
Acquisition Premium 
Connected  First-degree Connected Connected  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
    
  A_higher position -0.1674*** -0.1678*** -0.3060*** -0.4775*** 
  
 
(-3.29) (-2.97) (-3.68) (-3.74) 
  A_T same level position -0.0528* -0.0508 -0.1233* -0.3695*** 
  
 
(-1.67) (-1.61) (-1.77) (-3.22) 
  T_Retain 
    
-0.1040*** -0.0959*** 
 
    
(-3.38) (-2.99) 
Target 52-week high  0.0185*** 0.0114 0.0246 0.0003 0.0180*** 0.0106 
 
(2.65) (1.61) (0.63) (0.00) (2.58) (1.50) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0132 0.0500** -0.0000 0.0000 
 
(-0.32) (-0.20) (1.51) (2.89) (-0.00) (0.01) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0021** -0.0026*** 0.0006 -0.0235** -0.0024** -0.0029*** 
 
(-2.04) (-2.66) (0.09) (-2.24) (-2.29) (-3.03) 
Relative deal size  -0.0530*** -0.0608*** -0.3180*** -0.4711** -0.0517** -0.0608*** 
 
(-2.66) (-2.77) (-3.01) (-2.95) (-2.41) (-2.60) 
Pure cash deal  0.0853*** 0.0729*** -0.1019* -0.1426 0.0845*** 0.0743*** 
 
(3.79) (2.98) (-1.74) (-1.75) (3.72) (3.04) 
Hostile takeover 0.0330 0.0393 0.1756 0.1928 0.0439 0.0474 
 
(0.31) (0.36) (1.03) (0.77) (0.42) (0.44) 
Tender offer  0.1096*** 0.0517 0.2555*** 0.1872* 0.1035*** 0.0448 
 
(3.46) (1.63) (3.62) (1.95) (3.29) (1.42) 
Competing bid 0.1237** 0.1271** 0.1810 0.3978** 0.1237** 0.1264** 
 
(2.24) (2.23) (1.67) (2.46) (2.24) (2.22) 
Diversification -0.0238 -0.0198 -0.1044* -0.0783 -0.0242 -0.0218 
 
(-1.12) (-0.91) (-1.85) (-1.05) (-1.13) (-1.00) 
Constant 0.3666*** 0.5532*** 0.4198*** 0.0355 0.3671*** 0.5570*** 
 
(20.63) (7.80) (5.49) (0.12) (20.26) (7.94) 
 
      
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 228 228 66 66 228 228 
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.120 0.361 0.466 0.080 0.123 
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Table 8 - Determinants of acquisition premium in CEO connections 
 
In Table 8, we analyse the acquisition premium by adopting an alternative proxy – CEO connection. In all models, acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable 
indicating if the acquirer and target firms are socially connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between the offer price and the 
target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. The independent variable in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 5 is CEO Connection, which is equal to one if either 
the acquirer or target CEO connects the two merging firms. The dependent variables in Model 3, Model 4 and Model 6 are CEO first-degree connection and CEO second-
degree connection. CEO first-degree connection is defined as when acquirer CEOs also work as target board members (acquirer board member) or executives. CEO second-
degree connection happens when acquirer or target CEOs share past experience with board members or executives in the counterpart firm. Furthermore, we use the log 
percentage difference of the target’s 52-week high share price from Baker et al. (2012) in Model 2 and Model 4. In addition, we control for different acquirer, target and deal-
related characteristics. In all models, we control for industry and year fixed effects. In Model 5 and Model 6, we split the full sample into three groups (low, medium, high) 
based on the target 52-week high and show the multivariate analysis of premiums in the low/high target 52-week high subsample. For brevity, we do not report the results for 
the industry and year dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model 5 Model 6 
Low High Low High 
         CEO Connection -0.2891** -0.3117** 
  
-0.1400 -0.4563*** 
  
 
(-2.50) (-2.56) 
  
(-0.59) (-3.66) 
  
First-degree CEO connection 
  
-0.5075** -0.5704*** 
  
-0.8295 -0.5370*** 
 
  
(-2.39) (-2.60) 
  
(-1.64) (-3.26) 
Second-degree CEO connection  
  
-0.1266 -0.1317 
  
0.2476 -0.3992** 
 
  
(-1.10) (-1.11) 
  
(1.48) (-2.24) 
Target 52-week high  
 
0.0197 
 
0.0210 
    
 
 
(1.22) 
 
(1.29) 
    
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0004 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0057 -0.0017* 0.0071 -0.0017* 
 
(0.40) (-0.33) (0.45) (-0.07) (0.93) (-1.94) (1.15) (-1.91) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0037*** -0.0035** -0.0036*** -0.0034** -0.0012 -0.0051*** -0.0012 -0.0051*** 
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(-2.67) (-2.47) (-2.68) (-2.42) (-0.99) (-2.65) (-0.97) (-2.62) 
Relative deal size  -0.1463** -0.1580** -0.1489** -0.1514** -0.1925** -0.0940 -0.1912** -0.0930 
 
(-2.32) (-2.44) (-2.35) (-2.38) (-2.13) (-1.15) (-2.10) (-1.10) 
Pure cash deal  0.1326** 0.1369** 0.1329** 0.1519** 0.1120 0.1541* 0.1334 0.1640** 
 
(2.15) (2.19) (2.16) (2.44) (1.08) (1.91) (1.35) (2.01) 
Hostile takeover 0.4067** 0.4309** 0.3906** 0.3999** 0.5213 0.3549* 0.4721 0.3274* 
 
(2.26) (2.45) (2.18) (2.52) (1.29) (1.80) (1.34) (1.67) 
Tender offer  0.0528 0.0466 0.0577 0.0686 -0.0675 0.1173 -0.0263 0.1317 
 
(0.75) (0.63) (0.81) (0.94) (-0.57) (1.24) (-0.22) (1.45) 
Competing bid 0.1162 0.0997 0.1206 0.1162 0.2703 -0.0464 0.3573** -0.0632 
 
(0.89) (0.75) (0.92) (0.87) (1.57) (-0.25) (1.98) (-0.34) 
Diversification -0.0182 -0.0152 -0.0185 -0.0151 -0.0210 -0.0591 -0.0180 -0.0635 
 
(-0.29) (-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.70) (-0.21) (-0.80) 
Constant -0.6736*** -0.7101*** -0.6793*** -1.0902*** -0.8130*** -0.5437*** -1.1661*** -0.9619*** 
 
(-4.54) (-4.62) (-4.58) (-10.30) (-3.45) (-2.71) (-7.18) (-6.84) 
         
         Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 751 751 751 751 
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.092 0.095 0.090 0.055 0.086 0.072 0.080 
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Table 9 – Method of Payment 
Table 9 reports the logit regression on the method of payment. The dependent variable in all models is 
the Stock dummy, which is equal to one if the takeover transaction is fully financed with stock. The 
independent variable in Model 1 and Model 2 is Connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are 
socially connected with targets. The dependent variable in Model 3 and Model 4 is first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection happens if a director 
simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A 
second-degree connection requires a social tie between a director from the acquirer’s board and a 
director from the target’s board. This connection may be formed through any historical path, for 
instance employment, education or social clubs. Further, we control for different acquirer and deal-
related characteristics, as well as for industry and year fixed effects in Model 2 and Model 4. For 
brevity, we do not report the results for the industry and year dummies. All models contain the same 
control variables defined in Appendix A.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Stock as payment method Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Connection 0.6800*** 0.7955*** 
  
 
(3.55) (3.90) 
  
First-degree connection 
  
0.8667*** 0.8662*** 
 
  
(2.79) (2.77) 
Second-degree connection  
  
0.5829** 0.7159*** 
 
  
(2.50) (2.87) 
Target 52-week high  0.0900* 0.1160* 0.0894* 0.1047* 
 
(1.71) (1.82) (1.71) (1.69) 
Acquirer stock run-up 0.5428*** 0.5018*** 0.5371*** 0.4179** 
 
(2.88) (2.61) (2.82) (2.13) 
Acquirer firm size -0.2479*** -0.2103*** -0.2449*** -0.2100*** 
 
(-5.76) (-4.57) (-5.70) (-4.56) 
Relative deal size  -0.0674 0.0291 -0.0565 -0.0038 
 
(-0.49) (0.20) (-0.41) (-0.02) 
Hostile takeover 0.4920 0.3960 0.4766 0.3295 
 
(0.57) (0.47) (0.56) (0.39) 
Tender offer  -1.7878*** -1.5877*** -1.7903*** -1.6023*** 
 
(-5.84) (-5.18) (-5.84) (-5.25) 
Competing bid -0.4711 -0.4259 -0.4800 -0.4758 
 
(-1.10) (-0.97) (-1.12) (-1.10) 
Diversification -0.2404 -0.1664 -0.2423 -0.1235 
 
(-1.47) (-0.99) (-1.48) (-0.73) 
Constant 0.8776** -0.1185 0.8538** 0.0301 
 
(2.47) (-0.12) (2.40) (0.03) 
     Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.136 0.107 0.142 
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Table 10 –Endogeneity test 
 
Table 10 reports the endogeneity test – two stages least square (2sls) – for acquisition premium analysis. The instrument variable for social connection is previous social 
connection, which refers to a situation where acquirers and targets are socially connected three years before the takeover announcement. Similarly, the instrument variable for 
first-degree connection is previous first-degree connection, which describes whether a director simultaneously served on the acquirer’s and target’s boards three years before 
the announcement of the M&A deal. The instrument variable for second-degree connection is previous second-degree connection, which describes whether two individual 
board members, respectively from the acquirer and target, had social ties three years before the deal announcement. This connection may be formed through any historical 
path, for instance employment, education or social clubs. In all models, acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable indicating if the acquirer and target firms 
are socially connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal 
announcement. Furthermore, we use the percentage difference of the target’s 52-week high share price from Baker et al. (2012) as a measure of potential overpayment. In 
addition, we control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all models, we control for industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, we do not report the 
results for the industry and year dummies. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Acquisition Premium 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
First-stage: 
Second-stage 
First-stage: 
Second-stage 
First-stage: 
Second-stage 
First-stage: 
Second-stage 
Connection Connection 
First-degree 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
First-degree 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
           
Connection  
 
-0.1648* 
 
-0.1693* 
      
  
(-1.72) 
 
(-1.79) 
      First-degree connection 
  
  
  
-0.4502** 
  
-0.4525** 
   
  
  
(-2.14) 
  
(-2.42) 
Second-degree connection  
  
  
  
-0.0268 
  
-0.0222 
   
  
  
(-0.27) 
  
(-0.20) 
Target 52-week high  
  
-0.0019 0.0192 
  
 
0.0002 -0.0033** 0.0203 
   
(-1.36) (1.12) 
  
 
(0.31) (-2.44) (1.21) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0003* -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 
 
(-0.26) (0.43) (-1.68) (-0.07) (0.92) (-0.07) (0.28) (0.85) (-0.22) (-0.06) 
Target Tobin's Q  0.0000 -0.0038 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0035* 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0034* 
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(0.20) (-1.36) (0.09) (-1.29) (0.68) (-0.94) (-1.92) (0.65) (-0.95) (-1.72) 
Relative deal size  0.0373 -0.1406* 0.0215 -0.1510** -0.0052 0.0441* -0.1486* -0.0066 0.0449* -0.1615*** 
 
(1.41) (-1.82) (1.04) (-2.12) (-0.85) (1.69) (-1.85) (-1.05) (1.74) (-2.83) 
Pure cash deal  -0.0133 0.1273** -0.0183 0.1313** -0.0115 -0.0049 0.1324** -0.0122 -0.0063 0.1378** 
 
(-0.80) (2.22) (-0.97) (2.30) (-1.46) (-0.29) (2.12) (-1.49) (-0.37) (2.28) 
Hostile takeover 0.0372 0.3982** 0.0276 0.4204** 0.0622 -0.0269 0.4196** 0.0624 -0.0338 0.4439** 
 
(0.37) (2.21) (0.24) (2.51) (0.66) (-0.85) (2.12) (0.65) (-1.03) (2.54) 
Tender offer  0.0200 0.0611 0.0290 0.0550 0.0089 0.0146 0.0595 0.0091 0.0246 0.0522 
 
(0.84) (0.86) (1.01) (0.93) (0.60) (0.57) (0.85) (0.60) (0.95) (0.82) 
Competing bid -0.0185 0.1131 -0.0327 0.0972 0.0187 -0.0327 0.1186 0.0177 -0.0321 0.1024 
 
(-0.70) (0.92) (-1.09) (0.76) (0.73) (-1.21) (0.89) (0.68) (-1.17) (0.86) 
Diversification 0.0145 -0.0199 0.0152 -0.0153 0.0094 -0.0008 -0.0219 0.0098 0.0007 -0.0167 
 
(0.87) (-0.49) (0.83) (-0.28) (1.05) (-0.05) (-0.34) (1.04) (0.04) (-0.36) 
Previous Connection (IV) 0.9319*** 
 
0.9329*** 
       
 
(77.07) 
 
(62.50) 
       Previous First-degree connection (IV) 
 
  
0.9662*** -0.4137*** 
 
0.9625*** -0.4179*** 
 
     
(77.82) (-5.66) 
 
(68.76) (-5.58) 
 Previous Second-degree connection (IV) 
 
  
0.0401 0.8052*** 
 
0.0438 0.7959*** 
 
     
(1.61) 
  
(1.61) (24.07) 
 Constant -0.0345 -0.6653*** -0.0022 -0.7011*** -0.0138 -0.0149 -0.6749*** -0.0001 0.0059 -0.7133*** 
 
(-1.48) (-5.11) (-0.1) (-4.62) (-1.17) (-0.57) (-5.45) (-0.01) (0.29) (-4.48) 
           Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 
Adjusted R2 0.655 0.087 0.6289 0.085 0.6433 0.5545 0.094 0.6354 0.5438 0.092 
 
55 
 
Table 11 – Alternative target reference points 
Table 11 reports the premium analysis with social connection and alternative target reference points. In Panel A, the acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy 
variable indicating if the acquirer and target firms are socially connected. The independent variable in Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 is first-degree connection. 
Furthermore, we use the log percentage difference of the target’s X-week high share price from Baker et al. (2012) in all models. Panel B shows the multivariate regressions 
in the subsample of low/high target reference point. Target’s X-week high is computed as the log percentage difference between target peak price achieved during the past X 
weeks and target price four weeks before the deal announcement. The models include target 13-week high, target 26-week high, target 39-week high and target 104-week 
high as the target reference point in Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, respectively. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between the 
offer price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. A first-degree connection happens if a director simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and 
target’s boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. In addition, we control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics, as well as for industry and year 
fixed effects. All models contain the same control variables defined in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Premium analysis in the subsamples of low/high target reference points 
Acquisition Premium 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
13-week high reference point 26-week high reference point 39-week high reference point 104-week high reference point 
Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  
First-degree connection -0.5089 -0.3937*** -0.5089 -0.3937*** -0.5089 -0.3937*** -0.5089 -0.3937*** 
 
(-1.36) (-3.31) (-1.36) (-3.31) (-1.36) (-3.31) (-1.36) (-3.31) 
Second-degree connection  0.1676 -0.0594 0.1676 -0.0594 0.1676 -0.0594 0.1676 -0.0594 
 
(1.55) (-0.50) (1.55) (-0.50) (1.55) (-0.50) (1.55) (-0.50) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0056 -0.0017* 0.0056 -0.0017* 0.0056 -0.0017* 0.0056 -0.0017* 
 
(0.91) (-1.85) (0.91) (-1.85) (0.91) (-1.85) (0.91) (-1.85) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0013 -0.0053*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** 
 
(-1.05) (-2.67) (-1.05) (-2.67) (-1.05) (-2.67) (-1.05) (-2.67) 
Relative deal size  -0.2062** -0.0992 -0.2062** -0.0992 -0.2062** -0.0992 -0.2062** -0.0992 
 
(-2.30) (-1.12) (-2.30) (-1.12) (-2.30) (-1.12) (-2.30) (-1.12) 
Pure stock deal  0.1338 0.1523* 0.1338 0.1523* 0.1338 0.1523* 0.1338 0.1523* 
 
(1.34) (1.84) (1.34) (1.84) (1.34) (1.84) (1.34) (1.84) 
Hostile takeover 0.5358 0.3542* 0.5358 0.3542* 0.5358 0.3542* 0.5358 0.3542* 
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(1.49) (1.78) (1.49) (1.78) (1.49) (1.78) (1.49) (1.78) 
Tender offer -0.0684 0.1148 -0.0684 0.1148 -0.0684 0.1148 -0.0684 0.1148 
 
(-0.57) (1.26) (-0.57) (1.26) (-0.57) (1.26) (-0.57) (1.26) 
Competing bid 0.2967* -0.0563 0.2967* -0.0563 0.2967* -0.0563 0.2967* -0.0563 
 
(1.71) (-0.30) (1.71) (-0.30) (1.71) (-0.30) (1.71) (-0.30) 
Diversification -0.0227 -0.0634 -0.0227 -0.0634 -0.0227 -0.0634 -0.0227 -0.0634 
 
(-0.26) (-0.80) (-0.26) (-0.80) (-0.26) (-0.80) (-0.26) (-0.80) 
Constant -0.8404*** -0.5242*** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** 
 
(-3.68) (-2.59) (-3.68) (-2.59) (-3.68) (-2.59) (-3.68) (-2.59) 
 
        
Year-fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.078 0.067 0.078 0.067 0.078 0.067 0.078 
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Table 12 – Propensity Score Matching  
 
Table 12 presents propensity score matching (PSM) analysis to estimate the social connection effect on 
premium. Bootstrap is applied to estimate the standard error and confidence interval. The average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) compares the outcome between treated and untreated groups in the matched 
sample. Nearest neighbour matching (NN) is adopted as the matching algorithm to compute ATT. In Panel 1a 
and Panel 1b, the treatment group is the deals in which acquirers and targets are socially connected. The 
control group in Panel 1a is matched non-connected deals with similar baseline characteristics (excluding 
target 52-week high reference point). The control group in Panel 1b is matched non-connected deals with 
similar baseline characteristics (including target 52-week high reference point). Similarly, the treatment group 
in Panel 2a and Panel 2b is first-degree connected deals, while the control group is matched non-connected 
deals with same firm and deal characteristics (excluding target 52-week high reference point in the 
characteristics of the control group in Panel 2a; including target 52-week high reference point in Panel 2b). 
Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel 1a: Connection effect 
   Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 166 Observation 142 -20.3%* 0.121 -1.668 
       Panel 1b: Connection effect (target 52-week high in matching sample) 
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 153 Observation 135 -13.00% 0.100 -1.309 
       Panel 2a: First-degree connection effect 
  Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 48 Observation 46 -15.3%*** 0.065 -3.142 
Panel 2b: First-degree connection effect (target 52-week high in matching sample) 
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 47 Observation 43 -25.3%*** 0.073 -3.447 
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Appendix A 
     
Variables  Definitions  Source  
Panel A: Dependent Variables  
Acquisition premium Premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from the target's share price four 
weeks before the M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012).  
CRSP/SDC  
Panel B: Key Independent variables  
 Connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer and target share at least one 1st-degree or 2nd-degree 
connection. 
BoardEx 
1st-degree connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if a director (including CEO) serves on the acquirer’s and target's boards 
at the deal announcement. 
BoardEx 
2nd-degree connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if a social tie between the respective CEOs or directors of merging 
companies is present at the deal announcement.  
BoardEx 
CEO connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if either acquirer or target CEO connects the two merging firms.  BoardEx 
CEO first-degree connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer CEO (target CEO) also serves as a target board member 
(acquirer board member) or manager. 
BoardEx 
CEO second-degree connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer or target CEO share past experience with board members or 
executives in the counterpart firm.  
BoardEx 
Board connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if board members connect bidders with targets. BoardEx 
Board first-degree connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if bidding firms and targets share the same board member.  BoardEx 
Board second-degree connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if two individuals respectively from acquirer and target boards have 
social ties through past experience. 
BoardEx 
Higher level positions for Acquirer (Target) Dummy variable that equals 1 if an interlocking director holds a more important position in the 
acquirer (target) than in the target (acquirer), while the same level position indicates that directors hold 
the same level position in both firms. 
BoardEx 
T_retain Dummy variable that equals 1 if a target director is offered a board seat in the combined firm after 
acquisition.  
BoardEx 
Panel C: Firm characteristics  
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Tobin's Q (Q) In line with Masulis et al. (2007), we specify Tobin's Q as the ratio of market value by book value of 
the company's assets. 
COMPUSTAT  
Market Value (MV) The market value represents the size of the company. It is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the respective stock price at four weeks before the official deal 
announcement.  
CRSP  
Leverage The ratio of total debt by total assets. COMPUSTAT 
Return on Assets (ROA) We specify ROA as the ratio of the company's net income by the book value of total assets. COMPUSTAT 
Panel D: Deal characteristics  
Transaction value ($millions)  This variable accounts for the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer in order to obtain the 
target. We report the total dollar value as reported by SDC. 
SDC 
Relative deal size  This variable is computed as the transaction value divided by the market capitalisation of the acquirer, 
four weeks before the official deal announcement.  
SDC 
Hostile takeover Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal was reported as hostile. SDC 
Competing bid Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal involved more than one bid.  SDC 
Pure cash deal (Cash) Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal was paid entirely by cash. SDC 
Pure stock deal (Stock) Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal was paid entirely by stock. SDC 
52-week high (%)  Following Baker et al. (2012), we compute this variable as the log percentage difference of the target's 
52-week high share price over the share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement.  
CRSP 
X-week high (%) Following Baker et al. (2012), we compute this variable as the log percentage difference of the target's 
X-week high share price over the share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement.  
 
Stock Price run-up The buy-and-hold returns of bidding firms over the period from 200 trading days to two months before 
the announcement. 
CRSP 
 
